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Were Servants paid according to their               
Productivity ? 
Carmen SARASÚA 
Wages, or, more generally, remuneration, are a fundamental element in 
the study of any working group. Wages express in different ways the eco-
nomic and social value of work; they are a good indicator of the legal 
position of workers, since only free workers can contract their work; they 
help us to see the place of an occupation in the labour market, that is, in 
relation to other occupations. And they are the best indicator of the work-
ers’ standard of living, since, in a market society, wages are the main or 
only source of income for workers, and thus they determine their purchas-
ing power.1  
Wages have also been a central element of economic analysis. Stan-
dard or neoclassical economics defines wages as the price for labour, the 
main object of economics being to understand how prices are determined 
by supply and demand. So economics provide economic historians with a 
solid framework to interpret workers’ wages. Yet in the last decades a 
number of scholars, mainly from economic history but also from labour 
economics, have pointed to the shortcomings and limitations of this theo-
retical framework to account for such crucial facts as wage differentials 
among workers, particularly race, age and gender gaps.  
In this paper the main features of what we know about the remunera-
tion of domestic workers in the 18th and 19th centuries are outlined, and an 
attempt is made to see if the theoretical framework provided by economic 
theory can help us to interpret them. I suggest that our historical evidence 
on how remuneration of domestic servants was fixed and paid illustrates 
the limitations of mainstream economic analysis to account for wages in 
the service sector in general, and for wages of domestic service and gen-
der wage differentials in particular. I conclude that the notion of wages as 
 
1  I would like to thank Antoinette Fauve-Chamoux and Raffaella Sarti for providing me 
with the opportunity of discussing the history of domestic service within an interna-
tional research network, and Peter Scholliers and Leonard Schwarz for generously 
commenting  on a first version of this paper.  
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cultural constructs, rather than market prices, is more useful to understand 
domestic workers’ wages.2 
 
Origins of neoclassical economic theory: domestic service as unproduc-
tive work 
Before the marginalist theory of the late 19th century, two important no-
tions contributed to shape prevalent ideas about wages, and particularly 
about servants’ wages. The first was the notion of wages as subsistence or 
living wages. Until the end of the 18th century, European economic 
thought linked wages to the cost of living, that is, to the price evolution of 
the basic food items, mostly grain. Wages were the means by which 
workers paid for their own subsistence. If the prices of food and rent rose, 
wages had to follow, or governments had to face an increase in poverty 
and in the already large number of beggars. Since most domestic servants 
were living-in servants, that is, servants living in their masters’ houses, 
being fed and clothed by them, the idea of wages as subsistence wages led 
employers to regard the monetary part of their servants’ wages as unim-
portant: servants did not need them.   
A second notion contributing to a certain de-legitimation of servants’ 
wages arrives with Adam Smith. In what is considered to be the origin of 
western economic thought, The Wealth of Nations (published in 1776), 
Adam Smith defined domestic service (and service occupations in gen-
eral) as non productive, and as such, as an occupation creating no wealth 
to pay for the wages received. As Smith was vindicating the productive 
character of manufacturing and trade, in contradiction to the French 
physiocrats, who claimed that agriculture was the sole source of new 
wealth, he used “menial servants” as example of non productive occupa-
tions:  
“It seems (...) altogether improper to consider artificers, manufacturers and mer-
chants, in the same light as menial servants. The labour of menial servants does not 
continue the existence of the fund which maintains and employs them. Their main-
 
2  By servants I refer here to domestic servants, working mostly at home on 
domestic chores. Wages are broadly defined so as to include money but also food 
and lodging as well as other perquisites. See Peter Scholliers and Leonard 
Schwarz, “The wage in Europe since the sixteenth century”, in P. Scholliers and 
L. Schwarz (eds.) Experiencing Wages. Social and Cultural Aspects of Wage 
Forms in Europe since 1500, New York, Berghahn Books, 2003, pp. 3-19.  
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tenance and employment is altogether at the expense of their masters, and the work 
which they perform is not of a nature to repay that expense. That work consists in 
services which perish generally in the very instant of their performance, and does 
not fix or realize itself in any vendible commodity which can replace the value of 
their wages and maintenance. The labour, on the contrary, of artificers, manufac-
turers and merchants, naturally does fix and realize itself in some such vendible 
commodity. It is upon this account that, in the chapter in which I treat of produc-
tive and unproductive labour, I have classed artificers, manufacturers and mer-
chants among the productive labourers, and menial servants among the barren or 
unproductive.” (p. 639). 
In the chapter on productive and unproductive labour in the Wealth of 
Nations, he had, in fact, explained that servants’ labour was unproductive 
because it created no value (value being understood as a vendible com-
modity):  
“The labour of a manufacturer adds, generally, to the value of the materials which 
he works upon, that of his own maintenance, and of his master’s profit. The labour 
of a menial servant, on the contrary, adds to the value of nothing. Though the 
manufacturer has his wages advanced to him by his master, he, in reality, costs him 
no expense, the value of those wages being generally restored, together with a 
profit, in the improved value of the subject upon which his labour is bestowed. But 
the maintenance of a menial servant never is restored. A man grows rich by em-
ploying a multitude of manufacturers: he grows poor, by maintaining a multitude 
of menial servants.” (p. 314).    
Smith accepts that service occupations (not only domestic servants, but 
lawyers, physicians, public officers, create no value through their work) 
may be necessary and useful, and of course deserve to be paid: “The la-
bour of the latter [servant], however, has its value and deserves its reward 
as well.” However, service workers, and domestic servants in particular, 
had less social and economic legitimacy to earn wages. By opposing the 
behaviour of the manufacturer to that of the employer of servants, Smith 
is criticizing the dominant life style of the upper classes of his time, and 
trying to incentive a new model of industrious bourgeois. The mainte-
nance of “a multitude of menial servants” is the best example of irrational 
behaviour he can think of.  
The idea of services, and particularly domestic services, as unproduc-
tive labour was maintained by economists after Smith. In his 1820 Princi-
ples of Political Economy, Malthus limited himself to a slight correction 
to Smith’s principle: “He defined productive labour as that labour that 
produced material wealth. He objected, however, to the term unproductive 
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labour because he believed it connoted that such labour was unimportant. 
He preferred ‘to substitute the term personal services for unproductive 
labour”.3 
In the second half of the 19th century Marx reinforced this classical un-
der valuation of service work, particularly of domestic service: as domes-
tic servants failed to create surplus labour, they were “living not from 
capital but from revenue”, and as such defined as non-productive, rela-
tively idle workers.4 This definition of domestic workers as unproductive, 
closer to paupers or rentiers than to factory workers, had important impli-
cations for political practice and for social consideration in general: since 
only workers producing surplus value were exploited, political activism 
and trade unionism made sense only among the truly exploited class. The 
same process that constructed factory workers (particularly male factory 
workers) as the real working class, constructed domestic workers (and 
female workers in general) as alien to it. For 19th-century revolutionaries 
as well as for 20th-century trade unionists, one of whose main activities 
was pushing for higher wages, domestic workers were too close to the 
bourgeoisie and too distant (physically as well as mentally) from the 'real' 
working class.  
A main contribution to economic theory, and in fact what is considered 
to be the foundation of neoclassical economic thought, took place in late 
19th century with the marginalist theory, which assumes that wages equal 
the marginal product of labour. Wages, thus, express workers’ productiv-
ity. Increases in productivity are achieved through capital investment, that 
is, mechanization. Marginalist theory of wages mirrored the age of indus-
trial labour and mass production, but failed to account for productive sec-
tors difficult to mechanize, like parts of the service sector, which has nev-
ertheless became the main productive sector of Western economies in the 
20th century.   
 
3  E. K. Hunt, History of Economic Thought. A Critical Perspective, Belmont, Wad-
sworth Pub., 1979, p. 71.  
4  “The creation of surplus labour on the one side corresponds to the creation of minus 
labour, relative idleness (or not-productive labour at best), on the other. This goes 
without saying as regards capital itself; but also holds then also for the classes with 
which it shares; hence of the paupers, flunkeys, lickspittles, etc. living from the surplus 
product, in short, the whole train of retainers; the part of the servant class which lives 
not from capital but from revenue”. K. Marx, Grundrisse. Introduction to the Critique 
of Political Economy. Quoted in E. Higgs, “Domestic servants and the households in 
Victorian England”, Social History, 8: 2, 1983, pp. 201–210.  
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Wages as cultural constructs 
Since the 1960s, many labour economists have disagreed with this theo-
retical framework to explain labour markets, particularly wage levels and 
wage differentials, and have pointed to the relevant role played by institu-
tions in shaping long term economic behaviour. For their part, social and 
economic historians working on wages and other forms of remuneration 
argued that customs, traditions, and conventions played a fundamental 
role in fixing wages. The definition of wages as customary rather than 
market wages accounts better for, among other questions, the too suspi-
ciously stable evolution of wage levels in preindustrial times.5 
Working since the 1980s to understand the gender wage gap, feminist 
historians have also made an important contribution to this critique of 
economic analysis by pointing to the fact that the very large gap between 
female and male wages in preindustrial and industrial times cannot be 
explained solely by differences in productivity. They have gone beyond 
defining skills and qualifications as cultural rather than purely technical 
features. Gendered notions of ‘fair’ and ‘appropriate’ wage influenced 
what employers paid their workers. The institution of the “family wage”, 
the notion of a salary for male workers sufficient to maintain their fami-
lies, expanded during the second half of the 19th century and was sup-
ported both by mostly male trade unions and employers.6 Employers 
bought industrial peace by agreeing to employ male instead of female 
workers, who were much cheaper and in many trades less militant due to 
their lower union affiliation. By defending their right to earn wages higher 
than those of women in order to preserve their role of heads of house-
holds, male workers were above all defending their right to have a paid 
occupation in preference to women. And they gained a social recognition 
that they, as much as middle class men, had a right to have housewives to 
take care of them, their homes and their children. Women workers were 
the only losers of this historic deal, as they increasingly lost their indus-
trial jobs and were forced to employ themselves in undervalued and little 
 
5  P. Scholliers and L. Schwarz, “The wage in Europe since the sixteenth century”, in 
Experiencing Wages, pp. 3–24.  
6  Alice Kessler-Harris, A Woman’s Wage. Historical Meanings & Social Consequences, 
Lexington, The University Press of Kentucky, 1990. See, however, J. Burnette, “An 
investigation of the female-male wage gap during the industrial revolution in Britain”, 
Economic History Review (1997), 257-281, for a classical vision of gender wage dif-
ferences as the result of differences in productivity.    
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paid occupations, such home manufacturing, domestic service, or prostitu-
tion. In this process, market forces played only secondary roles. Wages 
were socially and culturally constructed as “woman’s wages” or as “man’s 
wages”, as much as in the U.S. wages were constructed along race and 
ethnic lines. This approach seems more useful to understanding how ser-
vants’ wages were fixed. Individual skill or capacity, that is the productiv-
ity of individual workers, helps to provide us with an approach to work-
ers’ pay, but it may be rather simplistic in view of the complexity of the 
process of wage fixation. Let us now turn to the historical evidence on 
domestic servants’ wages.  
 
What do we know about servants’ wages?  
Wages and remuneration in general is not a well known aspect of domes-
tic service history. Authors refer to the silence of the sources, the private 
and non written character of the contracts, the wide variety of domestic 
occupations, and the importance of the non-monetary components of do-
mestics’ remuneration, among other questions, to account for this gap. My 
own research confirms this difficulty: studying domestic service adver-
tisements from 18th and 19th century Madrid newspapers, I found only a 
few ads where salaries and other benefits were explicitly mentioned.7  
Despite all the uncertainties about them, wages play a central role in 
the way crucial features of domestic service have been explained: the fact 
that service was the main occupation in most European towns until the 
second half of the 19th century, the decision of rural youngsters to migrate 
to the city, the preference of wealthiest employers for male domestics, the 
increasing feminisation of service in the 19th century, etc. This makes 
remuneration a crucial aspect of the history of domestic service. And al-
though we are not yet in conditions to write a history of domestic work-
ers’ remuneration, it is possible to reconstruct its main characteristics:  
 
a. Large differences in servants’ wages, reflecting complex servant 
hierarchies, personal characteristics of the servants, and employ-
ers’ decisions.  
b. Importance of in-kind remuneration. 
 
7  C. Sarasúa, Criados, nodrizas y amos. El servicio doméstico en la formación del mer-
cado de trabajo madrileño, 1758–1868, Madrid, Siglo XXI, 1994. Remuneration and 
wages in pp. 216 - 226.  
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c. Nominal wages lower than in other occupations, but higher real 
wages, particularly in periods of price inflation, due to boarding 
as a part of remuneration.  
d. Irregularity of money payments. 
e. Highly valued qualitative aspects of domestic service.  
f. Lower ability to bargain collectively for wages and working con-
ditions.  
 
a. Differences in servants’ wages 
Studies of domestic service point to large differences in domestics’ wages, 
social status and working conditions. These differences were particularly 
apparent in the 18th and 19th century among servants of the nobility and 
wealthy bourgeoisie, who employed large numbers of them and developed 
a complex hierarchy, to a large extent identified by differences in remu-
neration.  
It is difficult to clearly identify the factors accounting for these differ-
ences in remuneration: skill and experience played an important role (as 
human capital theory would predict), but the personal characteristics of 
the servant (race, legal status, age, gender, and class) were fundamental as 
well. Large differences in the remuneration of domestic servants can also 
be attributed to employers’ individual decisions. In her study of domestics 
in 19th century Florence, Casalini finds “truly surprising wage differ-
ences”, that reveal “the wealth and generosity of employers”. In the 
1870’s and 1880’s, whilst the waitress to princess Olga Tubersckok made 
90 lire per month (plus housing and food), the male servant of a priest was 
making 100 lire a year. There were those happy simply to receive food 
and housing, whilst others received 20, 25 or 30 lire a month.8 This total 
discretionality contradicts the very idea of a labour market, in which 
workers with similar skills obtain similar remunerations. The personal 
decisions of employers seem to reflect their appreciation for particular 
servants, as well as their desire to show their wealth.9 
Among the systematic sources of differences in the remuneration of 
domestics, gender was probably the most classic. The wages of male ser-
 
8  Maria Casalini, Servitù, nobili e borghesi nella Firenze dell’ Ottocento, Firenze, 
Olschki, 1997, p. 189. 
9  As for the gender wage gap, Casalini argues that in the highest ranks of the occupation, 
male servants’ wages were higher but often excluded food, because they were not 
forced to spend all of their daily workday at home.  
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vants were much higher than the wages of female servants, to the point 
that, as T. Veblen argued in his Theory of the Leisure Class (1899), male 
servants reflected better the wealth and status of their employers, and thus 
choosing to employ male servants was an obvious way of expressing the 
employer’s higher status. Whilst in the 18th century domestic service was 
performed by both women and men (it was still the largest male occupa-
tion in most European cities), from the later years of the century it became 
a predominantly female occupation, given the increasing alternative occu-
pations for men in transportation, manufacturing and the building trades. 
Was domestic service badly paid because it was a feminised occupation or 
did it became feminised because it was badly paid? My research suggests 
that feminisation led to a devaluation of domestic service, further rein-
forced by the fact that the middle classes (including ‘poor’ middle class 
families, such as those of shopkeepers, civil servants, teachers, etc., which 
to a large extent could not afford men’s wages) were now the main em-
ployers of domestics.10 
 
There is abundant evidence of domestic service being one of the very 
few occupations regarded as morally and socially adequate for women, as 
opposed to factory jobs. But we also know that, whenever an occupation 
has been recommended as suitable for women, women’s social obligation 
to accept much lower wages than men was determinant. For instance, 
opponents to minimum wage for women in the US in the 1920’s argued 
that women should instead be more willing to become domestic servants, 
where they could live with lower wages and even save part of them.11   
 
b. importance of in-kind remuneration 
Unlike most other wage workers, a majority of domestic servants were 
(and a certain percentage still are) live-in workers, that is, workers living 
in their employers’ house, as part of the household (in fact, the group of 
servants received the name of “family” in the 18th century). Being a liv-
ing-in servant meant that at least part of their remuneration was in kind: it 
 
10 For a discussión of servants’ employers in 19th century England, L. Schwarz, “The 
declining number of servants in England, 1650-1900”, paper presented at the Conference 
on Models of Domestic Service, Munich, 2003.  
11  “But women, objecting to their endless hours, close supervision, and live-in condi-
tions, frequently refused them”. Kessler-Harris, A Woman’s Wage, p. 45.   
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consisted of food and lodging, plus working clothes and shoes and other 
perquisites. These non-monetary components of their remuneration consti-
tuted around three quarters of the total wage, according to most ac-
counts.12 Graph 1 shows the evolution of the monetary and non-monetary 
components of domestic servants’ wages in Norway.13  
 
[Graph 1] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12  For mid-19th century Paris, “the monetary wage represented less than half of the total 
value of the servant’s wage”. Theresa McBride, “The Modernization of Woman’s 
Work”, Journal of Modern History 49, June 1977, pp. 231–245. Quote in p. 240.  
13  Fritz Hodne, Ola Grytten and Jorund Alme, “Norwegian real wages: trends in prices 
and wages, 1850–1950”, in P. Scholliers and V. Zamagni (eds.), Labour’s Reward, 
Real wages and economic change in 19th and 20th century Europe, Aldershot, E. Elgar, 
1995, pp. 61–75. Data is based on the first Norwegian cost of living index, calculated  
in 1913 by the statistical office of the city of Oslo.  
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Living conditions were so bad for workers, particularly for children and 
women, that living in a comfortable house and eating every day was 
enough recompense for most of them:  
“To understand how children could be pressed into such servitude, one has to re-
call the general economic conditions of the time. In the 1890s thousands of Lon-
doners were homeless, sleeping in the parks, on the Embankment or in the recesses 
of London bridge. However badly a servant might be accommodated, it was no 
doubt better than the prevailing housing conditions for the poor in the London of 
the 1890s...”14 
This means that a qualitative feature of the servant wage (the fact that it 
was paid mostly in kind) compensated the quantitative aspect of wages 
being lower than in other occupations. The domestic servant was not only 
able to eat better herself or himself, but also to help unemployed or poor 
relatives, an image common in literary sources.  
Boarding as the main or only component of domestics’ remuneration 
helps also to better explain the social composition of domestic servants’ 
employers. Edward Higgs has argued that the idea of domestics as a form 
of conspicuous consumption (that is, well paid domestics working for the 
middle and upper classes) fails to account for the “large numbers of girls 
recruited from the workhouse, who were paid little, if anything”.15 Work-
house inmates that “could be employed at board cost”, as well as poor 
female relatives, worked in massive number for working class families. 
Sixteen per cent of heads of his mid-19th century sample of households 
containing living-in servants “were artisans, clerks or semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers” (p. 207). Not only girls or workhouse inmates; poor 
widowers and many other women found their living this way: “Single 
señor, not being able to maintain a maid servant, offers an independent 
room, with coal, lighting, species, vegetables and water to a widower or 
married woman, to assist him” (Diario de Avisos de Madrid, February 7, 
1759).  
Although not paid in cash, boarding was as fixed a component of the 
servant’s wage as the money part: the worker knew exactly what to ex-
pect, in terms of quantity and quality, about food, clothes and housing, 
 
14  Frank Victor Dawes, Not in front of the servants. A True Portrait of English Upstairs, 
Downstairs Life, New York, Taplinger, 1973, p.  24.  
15  Higgs, “Domestic servants in Victorian England”, p. 201.  
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and when it should be paid. Components of boarding were mentioned in 
the contracts or advertisements more often than money wages: chocolate 
was mentioned as part of the boarding in many advertisements in the sec-
ond half of the 18th century in Spain.16  
 
c. Nominal wages lower than in other occupations, but real wages higher, 
particularly in periods of price inflation, due to inclusion of boarding  
Boarding as part of the remuneration made the sector very attractive to 
workers in times of price inflation: during the second half of the18th and 
the early decades of the 19th centuries, with rising commodity prices in 
Europe eating up most of the purchasing power of nominal wages, ser-
vants did much better than workers who were paid mostly or totally 
money wages, and so living-in domestic service was one of the most 
looked-after occupations  
For McBride, “the most common motivation for the migration of do-
mestics to Paris was the attraction of substantially higher wage levels”.17 
In the second half of the 19th century, a male servant might earn 2.5 to 3 
times as much there, and a female servant twice as much. Higher wages 
existed in large cities for every occupation, but they were eaten up by the 
much higher cost of living. “Because they were boarded, however, Pari-
sian servants did not suffer much from the Parisian cost of living; their 
decision to come to Paris made more economic sense that that of other 
lower-class elements.” (p. 239).  
In Norway, and probably in other parts as well, he long-term tendency 
of the monetary part of servants’ wages to increase was interrupted only 
during WWI, when price inflation arrived to the highest levels.18 In fact, 
boarding gained weight as part of servants’ remuneration every time that a 
social of economic crisis took place. Early 19th -century, Spanish cities, 
devastated by the Napoleonic troops, witnessed dramatic changes in their 
labour markets. Civil servants and soldiers became unemployed due to the 
government’s inability to pay their wages, and employees in the trades 
were laid off, because of the general crisis. As advertisements published 
 
16  “40 reales y chocolate”, were offered as a monthly wage to a maidservant in the Diario 
de Avisos de Madrid, on July 18, 1758. “46 reales y dos libras de chocolate”, also to a 
maid servant, on September 20, 1760. Sarasúa, Criados, nodrizas y amos, p. 217.  
17  McBride, “The Modernization of Woman’s Work”,  p. 237.  
18  F. Hodne, O. Grytten and J. Alme, “Norwegian real wages: trends in prices and wages, 
1850–1950”, p. 69.  
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in the Journals during 1812 prove, the main strategy used by these new 
unemployed and homeless from the middle classes was to offer them-
selves as domestics, simply for the food and housing. In times of crisis, 
then, boarding became a privilege for most workers, who were ready to 
work simply for it.  
Yet the value attached by servants to boarding as part of their remu-
neration changed during the 19th century. Domestic workers (male domes-
tic workers in particular), were now in a urban and industrial environment, 
with new job opportunities in industry and trade, jobs with a fixed work-
ing schedule and more independence. Furthermore, working class culture 
heavily rejected the concept of personal service. Increasingly, being 
housed and fed at the master’s house appeared less attractive. William 
Tayler, a footman writing in 1837, described the life of a servant “as 
something like that of a bird shut up in a cage. The bird is well housed and 
well fed but is deprived of liberty”.19 In Spain, conservative voices la-
mented at the end of the 19th century the fragility of religious beliefs and 
traditional life among working class women. The worst manifestation of 
this “sinister change” was their “sick preference for the dangerous life of 
the cigar-maker, instead of occupying themselves in domestic service”.20 
This changed perception suggests that the in-kind component of do-
mestic servants’ remuneration was less valued, and this probably forced 
the composition of the remuneration to change.  
 
d. Highly valued qualitative aspects of domestic service  
Living in the employer’s house also meant a closer, more personal relation 
with the family, which often opened the door to important benefits, such 
as gifts and inheritances. Privileged domestics were ‘protected’ in many 
ways by the family. Wet nurses are a good example : they developed a 
very special relationship with the family’s children and were regarded as 
‘second mothers’ for them. The interest of domestics in developing these 
relationships of patronage can be shown in the case of late 19th-century 
Florence, where more than one third of domestics had members of the 
highest ranks of society attending as witnesses to their weddings.21  
 
19  Burnett (ed.), Useful Toil, p. 185. 
20  Geraldine Scanlon, La polémica feminista en la España contemporánea (1868–1974), 
Madrid, Siglo XXI de España Editores, 1976, p. 86.  
21  Casalini, Servitù, p. 194.  
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In some periods and for certain types of servants, domestic service was 
an attractive occupation for these qualitative aspects. This was so for two 
main reasons. Firstly, because in large cities, and in periods when regional 
differences were still intense, rural young women were ready to trade high 
wages for friendly environments. In late 19th century Morriña, a novel by 
the famous Spanish writer Emilia Pardo Bazán, the young maid-of-all-
work from Galicia working in Madrid complains bitterly of a previous 
stay with a non Gallego family: she would not understand the language 
spoken (Spanish), and would lament never heard about her homeland. 
“For half the pay and double workload I want to serve someone from my 
country”.22  
Secondly, because closeness to the employers meant a real possibility 
of upward social mobility, which for many historians of domestic service 
was a reality for domestic servants. Upward social mobility was partly 
achieved through savings (which tells about the importance of money 
wages for many domestics), but also through acculturation, the contact 
with middle class values, rituals, behaviour, and language. A young man 
or woman who entered service entered also life in a different social envi-
ronment. Many of them were able to acquire the skills needed for a new 
occupation, including literacy.23   
 
e. Irregularity of money payments.  
A second implication of servant wages being mostly in kind is that mas-
ters saw the money payment as not really needed by servants, and thus not 
required to be paid on a regular basis. This is evident from the many in-
stances we know of masters paying their servants only once a year, or at 
their deaths, as many employers’ wills show by mandating delayed wages 
to be paid to their servants;24 or by masters simply not paying their ser-
 
22  See 3rd ed., Barcelona, Impr. De Henrich y ca., 1895. 
23  Theresa McBride, “Social mobility for the lower classes: domestic servants in France”, 
Journal of Social History, 1974, pp. 63–78; J. Jean Hecht, The domestic servant class 
in eighteenth-century England, London, Routledge and Paul, 1956, particularly ch. 
VII, “The rewards of service: social advancement”; Raffaella Sarti, “Il servizio domes-
tico: un canale di mobilità sociale ? Il caso di Bologna (fine ‘700-inizio ‘900)”, Sec-
ondo Congresso Italo-Iberico di Demografía Storica, 1992, vol. I, pp. 187–213.  
24  In the Netherlands, “Payment once a year (or sometimes twice a year) was the norm 
for living-in staff, such as servants, farmhands and maids. Since this payment was on 
top of room and board, the actual amount of money involved did not have to be that 
much, especially not once advances of, say, one guilder pocket money per week had 
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vants at all. Because servants received their money wages when their sub-
sistence was already paid for, and very often only once a year, those who 
really received their money wages had a much higher capacity to save and 
to spend than other workers. They were able to lend money to their fami-
lies or even to their masters.  
In his study of the 18th century French trades, Sonenscher found “an 
essential difference in the natural law tradition between the status of jour-
neymen and the status of domestic servants”.25 This essential difference in 
legal status conditioned to a large extent the forms of remuneration for 
their work:  
“The usual phrases (…) concerning the payment of wages in eighteenth-century 
France…were ‘le prix de son travail’, ‘le prix d’une journée de travail’, ‘le prix de 
la façon’, and, less currently, ‘le salaire’, or, finally, the word ‘gages’. This last 
term was indicative of the difference between those employed for limited periods, 
who were usually journeymen or labourers, and those employed for longer periods. 
It was used almost exclusively in connection with payments to domestic servants. 
There were good reasons for this limited usage. The terms ‘le prix d’une journée’ 
or ‘le prix de son travail’ denoted the contractual and limited nature of the en-
gagement. Labour was hired for a certain price for a certain duration. (…) The 
status of domestic servants was somewhat different, since they had engaged them-
selves to their masters or mistresses (and were therefore ‘à leur gages’), for ex-
tended periods (…) In addition, they worked in their employers’ households (rather 
than a boutique or atelier) and used their possessions. The nature of the engage-
ment was therefore more extensive. The wages of servants were the price of their 
engagement: the wages paid to journeymen were the price of their labour.”  
Most important than the irregular character of money payments is to what 
extent servants received directly the money payments they were entitled 
to:  
“Servants did not always receive wages directly. The merchant Pierre Lacoste paid 
a chambermaid’s wages directly to her peasant father. Similarly, Monsieur Flahaut 
________________ 
been deducted”. Jan Lucassen, “Wage payments and currency circulation in the Neth-
erlands from 1200–2000’, in Jaarboek voor Munt- en Penningkunde, vol. 86, 1999 
(published in 2001), pp. 1–70. Quote from p. 6.  
25  M. Sonenscher, Work and Wages. Natural law, politics and the eighteenth-century 
French trades, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 70.  
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sent foodstuffs or coals to the parents of servant girls, or paid rents on fathers’ 
farms for girls who served the Flahaut family from 1811 to 1877”26  
Simonton concludes: “Instead of saving, some girls had no funds at their 
disposal.” Not paying wages directly to servants but to their fathers was 
relatively common among female servants of rural origin, young and un-
married. But among adult, married female servants the point is that they 
often had no actual capacity to spend their wages, since all family earn-
ings were administered by husbands or fathers.27 This widespread practice 
contradicts the notion that labour markets are formed by individuals who 
own their labour and are able to freely contract in the market, earn their 
wages and use them for their own needs.    
 
f. Lower ability to bargain collectively for wages and working conditions 
Domestic service was performed in private homes, not in factories or 
workshops. This space and symbolic privatisation of the work place of 
domestic workers had important implications for their wages. Firstly, 
because workers were isolated, they had little opportunities to communi-
cate with co-workers, and so discussion of labour problems was extremely 
difficult. Secondly because, as a result of this identification with the pri-
vate realm, domestic service was seen as a private relation between the 
employer and the employee, rather than as a work relation. Unions’ pres-
sure to improve workers’ conditions and state intervention to guarantee 
workers’ rights, were almost totally absent from domestic service. Protec-
tive legislation, including working day limitation, child labour prohibition, 
regulation of night work, and minimum wage, were never applied to do-
mestic servants, as labour inspection never arrived to the sector. The tradi-
tion of economic and social policy described in the first pages, which 
regarded service work, and particularly personal and domestic services, as 
non-productive, had no doubt much to do with this absence.  
 
 
 
26  Deborah Simonton, A History of European Women’s Work. 1700 to the Present, Lon-
don/New York, Routledge, 1998, p. 105. She is quoting examples from Scott and Tilly 
and Margaret Darrow. 
27  As the paper by Oyzeguin on Turkish domestic workers shows. 
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Can domestic servants’ productivity be defined and measured?  
 
Productivity is a basic indicator of economic performance. But this eco-
nomic concept was developed to account for industrial factory production, 
and its capacity to account for production in other sectors, particularly in 
the service sector, is very limited.  
There are two basic ways of purchasing work: by the time (by hour, 
day, month or year), and by the task. When purchasing labour by time, the 
main problem of employers is to monitor the intensity of work (which 
explains the endless variety of devices to control whether the worker is 
actually at work). When paying labour by the task (the piece rate system), 
the main problem is not the time (since the worker is the one interested on 
working as rapid as possible), but the quality of the work done. Most do-
mestic workers were paid by time, usually by the year if they were living-
in servants. In the case of servants living and working at the employers’ 
home, the problem of monitoring the intensity and quality of the work 
done was to a large extent solved. Middle-class employers lived physi-
cally close to their servants, so they knew at any moment where the do-
mestics were and what they were doing. In larger households, masters 
employed a housekeeper whose job was precisely to monitor the work of 
the rest of the domestics. Working hours were long, beginning at 5 or 6 
and ending at 11 or 12, and days off one (sometimes half a day) a week. 
Most importantly, living-in servants were always “on call”: they could, 
and in fact they were, called at any moment, at night, or in their day off. 
As for the work intensity, many examples in the literature show domestic 
servants not working when masters are gone. This is why a traditional 
way to control servants’ work in their masters’ absence was to fix up tasks 
to be done. 
The relation between domestic service and productivity poses at least 
three problems: first, the service sector has a lower potential than industry 
or agriculture to incorporate technological innovations (such as mechani-
zation) or organizational innovations (such as mass production) and thus 
to intensify production. Second, because most services involve an impor-
tant element of interpersonal relationship, in the production of services 
intensification and speeding up of the working process in services opposes 
itself to the quality of what is delivered in a more intense way than in 
other sectors. And thirdly, in the service sector workers can be hired to do 
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no work other than displaying their employers’ wealth. I will examine 
these three problems now.  
 
a. Lower potential for services to mechanize 
The service sector has a lower potential to incorporate technological inno-
vations, and particularly to mechanize. Technical innovations that have an 
impact on labour productivity are the responsibility of employers, who 
have to pay for them. In the industrial sector, technological investments 
took place only if owners had prospects of increasing benefits, either by 
lowering labour costs or by intensifying production. Mass production has 
been a powerful incentive to mechanization in industry, but is not possible 
in the service sector, much less in personal services. Development of mass 
production has historically been favoured by three conditions:  
a. The first condition is production spatially concentrated in a work 
space, be it a factory or a commercial centre. The fact that domes-
tic service takes place at the individual homes of the employers 
prevents the technological innovations associated with spatial 
concentration of production to be incorporated.  
 
b. The second condition favouring mass production and mechaniza-
tion is the labour process being divided into small operations to be 
constantly repeated. Division of labour was, according to Adam 
Smith, the most basic technique to intensify productivity, and was 
the basis for the Fordist revolution in industry, based upon chain 
production. Yet this division of labour can rarely be applied to 
services, particularly personal services. Unlike public services, 
personal services are by definition, individual: only one person is 
required to feed a child, to take care for an elderly person, to cook 
lunch for a family. The worker is required to do the entire service, 
not just a small part of it, so it makes no sense to cut the working 
process into small pieces. Chain production and mechanization 
are in fact the very opposite of personal services. 
 
c. The third condition is the product being standard. Mass produc-
tion in both industry and agriculture has required a certain degree 
of standardization of the unit of output, a process that arrives at 
the extreme in industrial chain production. Personal services can-
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not be standardised. This is also the reason why piece rates have 
never been a system of remuneration in domestic service, because 
piece rate wages require the quantity of work to be measured.  
 
In sum, domestic service fulfils none of the conditions that favoured the 
adoption of technical innovations and were fundamental to increase pro-
ductivity. As a result of this lower potential of services to incorporate new 
technologies (technologies which developed precisely to speed up mainly 
the industrial and agricultural production process), the amount of time 
required by some of the tasks performed by domestic workers is not very 
different today from the time required a century ago (with the exception of 
laundering).  
A second consequence of this lower potential of services to increase 
labour productivity is the lack of competition among service workers. 
Competition among workers, fuelled by mass migration since the late 19th 
century, was the driving force behind technological innovation in industry 
and agriculture, particularly international competition. It was because of 
the higher productivity of American agricultural workers that European 
farmers were forced to mechanize. But except for some highly qualified 
occupations (precisely the ones that are more technological, like health 
services), markets for services were not international until very recently. 
The reason is that the personal characteristics of the worker, be these real 
or perceived (such as for instance regional stereotypes of cleanness) are 
very important in domestic service. Domestic services include physical 
proximity between the employer and the employee; access on the part of 
the employee to the employer’s most private spaces and valuable posses-
sions (for instance, the employee is responsible for the employer’s chil-
dren). This explains why the worker’s language, country or region of ori-
gin, gender, age, race and physical appearance, become determinant in 
personal services. This is why personal networks have always been a main 
source for hiring domestic workers. In the absence of personal recom-
mendation, letters of reference from peers, and stereotypes, work very 
powerfully.  
What this means in economic terms is that domestic workers are not 
easily replaceable: employers will not necessarily replace a domestic 
worker by another solely because the latter is cheaper. In other words, 
there is no competition through prices, and thus a basic element to in-
crease productivity is absent in domestic service. The internationalisation 
Were servants paid according to their productivity ? 463 
of markets for services that is taking place nowadays (including interna-
tional migrations) is different from international markets for agricultural 
and industrial goods developed since the 18th century: flows of foreign 
services do not mean increasing competition and price reduction (and thus 
an incentive to technological modernization). Foreign domestic workers 
arrive because of an insufficient local supply of domestic workers. There 
is no competition and thus no need to reduce prices. This process takes 
place in other services as well: Spanish nurses are being hired in large 
numbers in England not in competition with English nurses (and thus not 
because they are paid less), but due to an insufficient supply of English 
nurses. 
 
b. quantity vs. quality in service production 
In the industrial sector, the concept of productivity is related to the inten-
sification of the worker’s effort and the speeding up of the production 
process. We can ask ourselves if this makes sense in domestic service. Did 
masters look for cooks who could cook very fast or rather they were look-
ing for sophisticated cooks, able to cook French dishes, and probably tak-
ing lots of time to prepare a meal? Did masters look for servants able to 
clean very fast, or was extreme rapidity interpreted as a job badly done? 
Was a wet nurse more valued (and her salary was higher) if she was able 
to feed five children in the same time that other wet nurse fed only one? 
The concept of productivity associated to speeding up of the working 
process makes no sense in cleaning or cooking, much less in caring. In 
personal services, quality seems often opposed to quantity. 
Employers disliked fast cleaning and even mechanical innovations al-
lowing for lighter work because these conflicted with the idea that a good 
quality service is only possible through much time and effort. At the end 
of the 19th century a letter published in the English newspaper The Sphere 
expressed the discomfort of employers at increasing rapidity:  
“Home is rapidly becoming the place that one seeks only when it is 
impossible to go elsewhere. The servant who takes an interest in her 
work seems no longer to exist, and in return for high wages, we get 
but superficial service. Where is the maid to be found who takes 
pride in the brilliance of the glass used upon the table or remembers 
of her own initiative to darn the damask? Every sort of contrivance 
now lessens labour (carpet sweepers, knife machines, bathrooms, 
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lifts) in spite of this the life of a housewife is one long wrestle and 
failure to establish order”.28   
The problem of the quality of services becomes further complicated in the 
case of domestic service, which has a large component of personal ser-
vice. In domestic service, the standard of a good job, the only possible 
definition of a job well done, is to please the master: a job well done is a 
job the master likes. A different master may have a completely different 
idea of how the floors should be cleaned or the laundry done. This intro-
duces an element of intense singularity, and also makes it impossible not 
only to observe anything close to “mass production” or standardization of 
the service, but also serves to question the very idea of domestic workers’ 
productivity. Expanding the concept of productivity so as to include quali-
tative productivity (raising quality), as opposed to physical productivity 
(physical output or quantity per hour of work) seems a possible solution to 
account for domestic servants’ remuneration.29 
 
c. The paradox of leisure workers 
Servants have also historically been hired to do no work: rather, they were 
hired to display the master’s wealthy lifestyle. The function of exhibiting 
the master’s wealth by doing no work besides accompanying the master or 
being available to him or her, was described by Thorstein Veblen in The 
theory of the leisured class. What mattered here was not what the servant 
did (the tasks performed), but their simple existence and public display as 
servants. The paradox described by Veblen consists in that these servants’ 
function was not work, but leisure, exactly like middle class housewives 
in the 19th and much of the 20th century were educated and trained to do 
no work (that is, no paid work). How can economic analysis account for 
these highly rewarded workers whose duty was wearing expensive clothes 
and to be near their masters, never doing any manual work ? 
 
 
28  Frank Victor Dawes, Not in front of servants. A True Portrait of Upstairs, Downstairs 
Life, p. 28. 
29  Reinhold Reith, “Wage forms, wage systems and wage conflicts in German crafts 
during the eighteenth and earlier nineteenth centuries”, P. Scholliers and L. Schwarz 
(eds.), Experiencing wages, 113-138.  
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Were servants paid according to their productivity?  
My initial question was aimed at discussing which theoretical framework 
was best placed to understand and interpret domestic workers’ remunera-
tion. As we have seen, standard wage theory was developed mainly to 
account for industrial labour and many forms of labour do not fit this 
model. In particular, the notion of productivity, basic in the neoclassical 
economic analysis, fails to account for how workers, particularly in the 
service occupations, are hired and their labour rewarded. The notion of 
qualitative productivity could be an alternative concept for these occupa-
tions. As standard wage theory is based on the notion of labour’s produc-
tivity, it fails to account for how wages have historically been established 
in domestic service. 
By studying domestic workers’ remuneration, both historical and con-
temporary, it is possible to see that wages are much more than payment 
for a commodity in the market, and also to observe the importance of per-
sonal relations in fixing “labour’s reward”. The importance of the per-
sonal characteristics of the worker, culturally defined, characteristics such 
as race, gender, age or class, are then translated into the perception of the 
worker’s qualification and worth. And, as a result, they became funda-
mental in determining the worker’s remuneration. By looking at domestic 
service, we can see that even the more basic notions of economic theory, 
such as markets, fail to account for the complexities of labour relations. In 
sum, domestic servants’ remuneration shows us that probably all wages 
should be analyzed as cultural artefacts rather than within a supply and 
demand framework.  
Servants were not paid according to their productivity, because produc-
tivity has little to do with domestic service. Speeding up the work process 
is not what servants’ employers were looking for. On the contrary, rapid-
ity and mechanization are usually seen as opposed to a quality service. 
Employers were reluctant to purchase electric domestic appliances and 
tended to prefer domestic workers doing domestic chores “old style”, 
either by hand or with traditional non electric appliances. Domestic ser-
vice includes personal services as well, and in this case (wet nursing, care 
of children, elderly and sick persons, attention to members of the family in 
general), permanent personal availability is the quality demanded.  
To a large extent, servants were paid simply following the employers’ 
desires and decisions, taken personally and in view of personal cases. 
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Personal satisfaction with personal services played a major role in the 
determination of both the forms and the amounts of remuneration. This is 
not to deny that there was a market for domestic servants, and that average 
wages for different domestic occupations existed. Domestic service is not 
an exceptional case in the workings of historical and current labour mar-
kets. Rather, domestic service shows to what extent values, traditions, and 
socially constructed roles shape supply and demand, and “labour’s re-
ward”, in history as well as in our days.   
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Fig. 1. A servant cook in a wealthy household. Engraving, 1862. Museo 
Municipal, Madrid. 
Frequent are the references to “sisa”, this servant practice to “fiddle the 
basket handle” when they go shopping, apparently benefiting from a semi 
institutionalized privilege. In France the kitchen maid used the same way 
to keep some coins after shopping (“faire danser l’anse du panier”). 
